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School Law Blog

Lead by Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq., this blog is devoted to current developments in New Jersey education law affecting school districts, charter schools, students, and employees.
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N.J. Supreme Court Rules That Logs of Government-Related Emails From Elected Officials’ Personal Accounts Are Subject to Disclosure Under OPRA

On June 11, 2026, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a decision in Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Bd. of Educ. (A-72-24) holding that the Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”) requires local school board members to produce email logs of government-related communications from their personal email accounts.

In January 2023, a requestor submitted an OPRA request to a local school board seeking various records, including the email logs of board members’ personal emails used to conduct board business during a specified period. When the board failed to respond to the OPRA request, the requestor filed an action in the Superior Court of New Jersey alleging OPRA violations. The trial court held that the board was not required to produce logs from the board members’ personal email accounts. The Appellate Division disagreed, finding the email logs from the board members’ personal email accounts discussing board business were subject to disclosure under OPRA.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the board must produce logs of the government-related emails contained in the personal email accounts of the board members. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court noted that OPRA’s broad reach includes correspondence on personal devices related to government business. The court also relied on its holding in Paff v. Galloway Township, 229 N.J. 340 (2017), where it held that a log of electronically stored information in government email accounts is a government record.

The Supreme Court agreed with the requestor’s assertion that the board members could create acceptable logs by searching their private email account inbox, trash, sent and other relevant folders for board-related emails to create the requested logs. The court further indicated that there may be other acceptable methods to create logs of government-related emails from individuals’ personal email accounts. The Supreme Court indicated that each board member should submit a certification detailing the search conducted of their personal email accounts to allow a court to accurately assess whether proper searches were conducted by the board members. The decision recognized that the issue could have been avoided altogether if the board members refrained from using their personal email accounts to conduct board business. Accordingly, government agencies should advise their employees, officers, elected officials, and other representatives to refrain from conducting government-related business on their personal email accounts.

Court Denies School District’s Motion to Compel IMEs

What constitutes good cause for compelling a student to attend an independent medical exam (“IME”)? The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey recently issued an unpublished ruling in the case A.T. v. Freehold Reg’l High School. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 24-822, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59410 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2026) that limited a school district’s right to request such an exam during litigation.

The parents of a minor student, A.T., alleged their child was discriminated against under the Americans with Disabilities Act because the school district failed to implement the student’s IEP. The student was diagnosed with a spinal-cord malformation and immune disfunction. The parents alleged that the student was frequently reprimanded by school staff for not completing his schoolwork when he experienced pain due to his conditions. The parents, both Albanian immigrants, separately alleged discrimination based on national origin.

During litigation, the school district filed a motion to compel HIPAA releases and to compel the student to attend two independent medical examinations with an orthopedic surgeon and an immunologist. These motions proceeded from the parents’ refusal to provide HIPAA releases to the school district or consent to the IMEs. The Court granted the school district’s motion regarding the HIPAA authorizations, finding that the medical records were relevant given the allegations.

However, the Court denied the school district’s motion to compel attendance at the two IMEs. The school district argued that the IMEs were necessary to assess the student’s medical conditions, and relevant because the plaintiffs sought damages for pain, suffering, and past and future medical expenses. The parents objected, arguing there was no good cause because the student had never seen an orthopedic surgeon or immunologist, the IMEs do not address the conditions at issue, and the request for IMEs was made in bad faith.

The Court denied the motion to compel the IMEs because it was unpersuaded that the IMEs were relevant. The IMEs were found to be of little relevance because the student had never seen an immunologist or orthopedic surgeon. Further the IMEs were premature because the school district had yet to review the student’s medical records, to which the Court had just granted them access. Thus, the Court denied the motion without prejudice.

Typically, a court may compel an IME when a party places their mental or physical condition at issue and upon a showing of good cause. In this case, the Court added an extra requirement that the party sought to be compelled must have previously seen a doctor of the same expertise as the examining physician, and the requesting party must review the available medical documents prior to making the request. Neither condition is found within Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a). Thus, the ruling creates a difficult standard, especially when parents refuse to provide medical records in the first instance. This decision signals that a court may place extra scrutiny on discovery demands when a minor student is involved, even when the student’s medical conditions are directly relevant to the case and the parents have refused to grant access to medical records. School districts and their attorneys may need to take greater care than is typical when selecting physicians for IMEs and drafting discovery requests.  

Appellate Division Reinforces Strict Compliance With the “Notice Requirement” of the Tort Claims Act

In S.S. v. Woodcliff Lake Board of Education, Plaintiff appealed an order dismissing his complaint for failure to serve a claim notice upon defendant Woodcliff Lake Board of Education (“Board”) pursuant to a provision of the Tort Claims Act (“TCA”), N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. The Appellate Division on March 9, 2026, affirmed in part and remanded in part.

Plaintiff’s son was an elementary student who was disciplined pursuant to the Board’s Harassment, Intimidation, and Bullying (“HIB”) policy. Plaintiff requested a hearing before the Board to contest the principal’s findings. The Board upheld the principal’s findings, and the Plaintiff filed an appeal with the New Jersey Commissioner of Education (“Commissioner”). While the appeal was pending, the Plaintiff filed a three-count civil complaint in the Law Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey alleging (1) negligence, (2) defamation, and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff sought compensatory damages and an order directing the Board to invalidate and remove the HIB finding from his son’s educational record.

The Board filed a motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to file a timely notice of claim under the TCA and sought to bar Plaintiff’s request for compensatory damages. The Board maintained the accrual date for Plaintiff’s causes of action was March 8, 2024, the date when the HIB investigation concluded, and Plaintiff was required to file a notice of claim by August 6, 2024.  

Additionally, the Board argued Plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies because Plaintiff’s redress lied solely with the Commissioner of Education. See N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6)(e). The Board asserted Plaintiff’s requests must first be fully adjudicated before the Office of Administrative Law and the Commissioner of Education.

The court determined Plaintiff was statutorily barred from pursuing monetary claims against the Board due to his failure to file a timely notice of claim under the TCA. The court agreed that May 8, 2024, was the accrual date, and the Plaintiff should have filed a claim notice by August 6, 2024. Additionally, the court concluded Plaintiff’s action was premature and he must first exhaust administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. Plaintiff sought reconsideration and requested the court clarify whether dismissal with prejudice precluded him from refiling after administrative exhaustion. He asked the court to amend the dismissal to be “without prejudice.” The court denied the request and Plaintiff appealed.

Plaintiff maintained he was only concerned with the “prejudicial designation attached to the exhaustion ruling.” He claimed the lower court’s order prematurely blocked opportunity for future litigation after the administrative exhaustion requirement is met.

The Appellate Division affirmed the court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s tort claims against the Board for failure to comply with the TCA. However, regarding the written order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, the Appellate Division agreed that the court’s written order dismissing his complaint could be “erroneously interpreted to preclude [P]laintiff’s right to exhaust the administrative process before the Commissioner.” Id. at 13. As such, the Appellate Division remanded and instructed the court to amend its order to provide that dismissal for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is without prejudice so that Plaintiff may complete an administrative appeal.

This decision reinforces the procedural protections afforded under the TCA, even in matters arising from student discipline and HIB determinations. School districts should promptly assess potential claims and determine whether compliance with statutory notice deadlines are required by either party.

Appellate Division Upholds Finding of HIB for Comments Made in Snapchat Group Chat

On March 13, 2026, the New Jersey Appellate Division in J.R. v. Township of Long Hill Board of Education affirmed the New Jersey Commissioner of Education’s (“Commissioner”) decision, upholding the Township of Long Hill Board of Education’s (“Board”) determination that a student’s conduct met the statutory criteria of harassment, intimidation, and bullying (“HIB”) under the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act (the “Act”).

An eighth grade student was the subject of HIB investigation following a report that he made demeaning comments about another District student (target) in a Snapchat group chat. The Snapchat group chat was comprised of over two dozen students. The target was not in the Snapchat group chat, but the student made vulgar comments about the target’s appearance, weight, and sexual orientation in the group chat. The student admitted to making the statements regarding the target. As a result of the conduct, the student received a six-day out of school suspension for violations of the middle school’s code of conduct.

The District conducted a HIB investigation and determined that the student’s actions constituted HIB. The District’s finding of HIB was reported to the Board. The student’s parent requested a HIB appeal hearing before the Board. The Board heard the appeal and affirmed the recommendation of the superintendent and upheld the determination that the student committed an act of HIB. The student’s parent then appealed the Board’s decision to the Commissioner, who transmitted the matter to the Office of Administrative Law, which was heard by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). After a two-day hearing, the ALJ upheld the HIB finding and discipline of the student. Thereafter, the Commissioner adopted the ALJ’s decision.

The student’s parent appealed the Commissioner’s final decision to the Appellate Division, which reviewed the Commissioner’s decision under the arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable standard.

On appeal, the student’s parent argued that the Board’s HIB policy ran afoul of the Act by adding the word “or” after subsection (a) of N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14, thereby making subsection (a) disjunctive rather than conjunctive. The Appellate Division rejected the parent’s argument, finding that the Act only requires one of the three subsections of N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14 to be satisfied to establish a finding of HIB.

The Appellate Division also rejected the parent’s argument that the District’s factual findings required the HIB to be overturned. Petitioner relied on a portion of the District’s HIB report that indicated the student was not aware of the potential impact on the target. The Appellate Division noted the language relied on by the parent spoke to the student’s subjective intent, which is not the standard under the Act. The Appellate Division then relied on the ALJ’s analysis finding that a reasonable eighth grader should have known his messages would have the effect of emotionally harming the target.

The Appellate Division held the ALJ correctly determined that the student’s conduct substantially disrupted or interfered with the orderly operation of the school or the rights of other students. The Court referenced the ALJ’s analysis of the widespread impact of the student’s conduct, including the target expressing fear of attending high school and requiring counseling and the student who reported the conduct fearing retaliation from other students. The Appellate Division rejected the parent’s argument that the target would not have been aware of the Snapchat messages but for administration informing the target, as the target reported to administration that she was informed of the messages by a friend. The Court also noted that the district was statutorily required to inform the parents or guardians of all students involved in alleged HIB incidents. See N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(5).

Finally, the Appellate Division rejected the parent’s argument that the HIB finding violated the student’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech because the student was not aware that his words would cause harm to the target. The Appellate Division reiterated that a reasonable eighth grader should have known the statements would harm the target. Further, the decision noted that to even accept the parent’s argument would require a finding that the Act violates the First Amendment. The parent did not raise that claim in the appeal. Therefore, the Appellate Division did not reach the merits of this claim.

Ultimately, the Appellate Division found that the Commissioner’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and upheld the finding of HIB.

Parents’ Constitutional Rights to Access School Property: Court Dismisses Due Process and First Amendment Claims

On March 6, 2026, the New Jersey District Court rendered an unpublished opinion in Sapp v. Trenton Bd. of Educ., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46397 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2026), on the issue of whether a parent could state a claim against the Trenton Board of Education and several staff members under the First and Fourteenth Amendments after the Plaintiff was banned from school property.

The Plaintiff, Rashon Sapp, had joint legal custody of his fourth-grade son, who was enrolled with the Thomas Jeferson Intermediate School. Plaintiff, a practicing Muslim, believed and participated in a weekly religious observance every Friday because, according to him, Friday is designated as a “Day of Assembly” in which Muslims are to leave off business and pray.

Plaintiff picked up the student two and a half hours early from school on the first and second Friday of the school year. The school’s principal expressed uncertainty as to if this was allowed, but she let Plaintiff take the student. The next Friday, a security guard told Plaintiff that he could not pick up the student. Plaintiff was told that Jamasja Barber, the student’s mother, informed the school that Plaintiff was only permitted to pick up his son on Mondays and Wednesdays pursuant to a family court order. Plaintiff was told by the school that the student could pray at school and that two and a half hours a week away was too much time to miss. Plaintiff threatened to sue and filed a complaint with the New Jersey Department of Education. Plaintiff returned the following Monday with two officers from the Trenton Police Department, who escorted Plaintiff to the Principal’s office to discuss why his religious request to pick up his son was denied. Two days later, Plaintiff reported a bias crime to the Trenton Police Department after the student was suspended from school and the student’s mother was called to pick him up, rather than the Plaintiff. Plaintiff was thereafter told by the Principal that there would be a meeting on Friday after the student returned from his suspension to discuss the ongoing issues with Plaintiff. When he arrived for the meeting, he was greeted by security officers and police, who informed him that he could not enter the building. The student’s mother, however, was allowed into the school where she had a meeting with school administration. Plaintiff then left the school without entering.

Twenty minutes later, Plaintiff received a letter notifying him he was prohibited from entering any Trenton Board of Education building for any reason. Forty minutes later, he received a notice that the student’s mother had sought an emergent hearing in the family court seeking a revised restraining order. The student’s mother’s application alleged that Plaintiff was not following the court order governing parenting time by requesting to pick up his son from school every Friday, and that plaintiff had been harassing school officials and demonstrating signs of mental instability.

Plaintiff filed suit against Thomas Jeferson Intermediate School, several school administrators, and the Trenton Board of Education after the school district banned him from school property and denied his request to pick up the student two and a half hours early each Friday for religious observances.  Plaintiff alleged a series of claims, including First Amendment Free Exercise claims, Violations of his 14th Amendment Due Process Rights, and a series of tort claims. At the heart of the case is the question: what rights do parents have to access school property?  

Plaintiff’s constitutional claims against the Board of Education and school administrators were all dismissed. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim was dismissed because the Court found that parents do not have an unqualified right to access school property. Plaintiff alleged that his rights were violated when he was banned from school property without due process. In analyzing the issue, the Court recounted that “[i]t has long been recognized that parents have a constitutional right to control the education of their children…. But such a right is neither absolute nor unqualified.” The Court found that, while parents have a right to direct their children’s education without unreasonable interference, that right does not include the right to access school premises.

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim was likewise dismissed. Plaintiff alleged his religious Free Exercise rights were infringed by the school “unduly preferring non-religion over religion and interfering with [his] right to peaceably assemble for religious purposes.”  The Court found that the Plaintiff had failed to show how the inability to remove the student from school impacts Plaintiff’s right to assemble and to exercise his religious rights. The Court further found that there was no suggestion that the school acted to suppress Plaintiff’s religious views or ideas. Accordingly, Plaintiff was unable to state a First Amendment claim.

The Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s various tort claims alleging negligence, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and interference with contractual relations, because Plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.

This case is significant because it supports a school district’s right to prevent unauthorized parents from accessing school property. Thus, school districts may constitutionally ban certain parents from accessing school facilities. Further, the Court’s decision underscores the fact that a parent’s religious rights are not infringed when the school district refuses to alter its policies and procedures to allow a child to regularly miss school for religious reasons. Specifically, it was not a violation of the First Amendment to prevent the Plaintiff from taking his child away from school for two hours each week to pray.  

Employee Health and School Safety: Terminations Under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination

Does an allergic reaction qualify as a disability under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD)? Is it unlawful to terminate someone due to symptoms from an allergic reaction? In a recent case, Dechert v. Totowa Bd. of Educ., No. A-0545-24, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 436 (App. Div. Mar. 11, 2026), the New Jersey Appellate Division considered these issues in the context of a school district employee. The Court ultimately concluded that the allergic reaction at issue did not qualify as a disability, and even if it had, the school board was within its rights to terminate the employee in order to protect the welfare of both the employee and the students.

Plaintiff, Stacie Dechert, was employed as a special education aide for the Totowa School District during the 2022–23 school year, providing one-on-one assistance to children with severe disabilities aged 6 to 8. From the start of her employment, Plaintiff disclosed that she had a pre-existing condition, sciatica. She never had any difficulty performing her job because of this condition. Plaintiff routinely wore a back brace at work and testified at a deposition that “she never experienced any negative treatment…due to her back issues.”

In April 2022, Plaintiff’s sciatica flared, and her doctor prescribed multiple narcotic pain medications for use as needed. On May 4, 2022, she injured her back when she was attempting to prevent a student from leaving the classroom. She received permission to go home during the school day to retrieve her back brace. While at home, she took half of a Flexeril and a half of Oxycodone, two different narcotics, for pain and returned to work.

Upon her return to work, Plaintiff experienced severe stomach pain and shortness of breath. She told a student who was in the bathroom to tell another teacher that she was not feeling well and could not breathe. She went in and out of consciousness in the restroom. The school nurse found her on the floor of the restroom, in a state resembling a seizure. Police administered oxygen, considered Narcan, and Plaintiff was transported to the hospital for treatment of an allergic reaction.

On May 6, the superintendent advised Plaintiff that she should resign from her employment and reapply the following school year. She declined, providing a doctor’s note on May 12 clearing her to return to work for her back injury. The note made no mention of the May 4 incident related to the medication she had taken. That same day, the school district terminated Plaintiff’s employment, advising that it was terminating her “with the students’ and staff’s best interests, safety, and welfare in mind…” and that they “firmly believe[d] that “there was good cause and justification to support [the] decision.”

In August 2022, Plaintiff filed suit under the LAD, asserting that she was disabled due to sciatica and alleging discriminatory termination. Both parties later moved for summary judgment. At oral argument, Plaintiff claimed that her allergic reaction constituted a disability. The school district argued that the Complaint alleged that sciatica was her only disability and that she was terminated due to her allergic reaction, which is not a disability.

The trial Court found in favor of the school district. It held that Plaintiff’s only disability was sciatica and there was no evidence of discrimination. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the court erred by failing to consider her allergy as a separate disability.

On appeal, the Court upheld the trial court’s findings.  It found no evidence that Plaintiff’s sciatica played any role in her termination, and her one-time reaction to medication did not meet the LAD’s definition of a disability. Even assuming the reaction qualified as a disability, the school district had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination: protecting the welfare and safety of students and staff.

This case is significant because it underscores the fact that not all medical conditions constitute a disability under the LAD. It also reinforces that, even if an employee has a medical condition, termination may be lawful if continued employment could compromise the safety or welfare of others.

NJ Approves New Leave Law: A Game-Changer for Employee Leave Rights and Employer Responsibilities

On January 19, 2026, former Governor Phil Murphy signed into law a bill that significantly reshapes employee leave rights and employer obligations in New Jersey. The legislation expands leave coverage by lowering the minimum number of employees an organization must have in order to be subject to the law and by reducing the length of time an employee must work for an employer to become eligible for leave. The purpose of the law is to ensure that newer employees and employees of small organizations receive the protection of New Jersey’s leave law.

Previously, New Jersey’s Family Leave Act (“NJFLA”) provided employees working at organizations with 30 or more employees up to 12 weeks of leave to bond with a new child, care for a sick family member, or for other qualifying reasons, with guaranteed job reinstatement after the leave. To qualify, employees were required to have worked for their employer for at least 12 months and must have worked a minimum of 1,000 hours in the previous year.

The new law significantly eases eligibility requirements. Employees now qualify for leave and job protection after just three months of employment with their employer and only 250 hours worked in the past year. Furthermore, the law reduces the threshold for employers, meaning organizations with as few as 15 employees (down from the current 30) are now subject to these provisions. For public entities, employees are already eligible for NJFLA leave regardless of employer size, and the only change is the shortened eligibility period of three months of employment and 250 hours worked in the past year.

It is important to note that the law does not alter the fact that employees who take NJFLA leave are eligible to receive up to 85% of their average weekly wages, subject to the maximum weekly benefit cap, while on leave through the New Jersey Family Leave Insurance (“NJ-FLI”) program.

For employers, this legislation represents a major shift. With fewer eligibility requirements, a wider range of employees are now able to take leave with guarantees of job protection, creating new compliance obligations. Employers will need to update policies and procedures to ensure that they comply with these expanded requirements and properly manage leave requests.   

While a limited number of states already provide job protection for employees outside the scope of the Federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), New Jersey’s approach positions it as a leader in this area.

More Than $18 Million Awarded to New Jersey Schools to Support Zero-Emission Transportation

On January 8, 2026, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”) announced nearly $32 million in grant awards to accelerate the State’s transition to zero-emission transportation. Of that total, more than $18 million was awarded to New Jersey schools and school districts to support the purchase of electric school buses and the installation of 41 fast chargers.

 This marks the second of three funding rounds under the $45 million Electric School Bus Grant Program and represents a significant expansion of New Jersey’s electric school bus fleet. The program was authorized by legislation signed by Governor Murphy in 2022 and is funded through the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities’ Clean Energy Fund.

Nine grants were awarded directly to schools and school districts, with additional awards issued to transportation contractors serving New Jersey schools. Notably, 11 of the grant recipients serve overburdened communities. In addition to financial support, recipients will receive technical assistance through New Jersey Fleet Advisor.

Beyond school transportation, NJDEP also awarded $13.6 million in grants to 15 public and private entities to support the installation of electric vehicle charging stations with fast charging ports, improving public access to charging infrastructure statewide. These awards are funded through proceeds from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) auctions and the Volkswagen Environmental Mitigation Trust. The significant investment in electric school buses and charging infrastructure throughout the state underscores that zero-emission transportation is no longer a future concept, but an operational reality for New Jersey. Among the many benefits of electric school buses, one of the most impactful is improved public health for children. Electric school buses eliminate diesel exhaust exposure, which has been linked to asthma and other respiratory conditions affecting school-aged children.

Changes to Cell Phone Use in Schools: What You Need to Know

On December 22, 2025, New Jersey lawmakers approved a bill that is expected to significantly limit cell phone use in public schools. The policy promoted by the bill is commonly known as a “bell-to-bell” ban, meaning it would apply for the entire school day. The final step is for the governor to sign the bill, which he has indicated he intends to do.

Under the bill, the New Jersey Department of Education must create guidelines to help local school boards develop rules about students’ use of internet-enabled devices, including cell phones. Each local board of education is required to follow these guidelines when adopting its own policy.

The ban applies to all public school students in kindergarten through 12th grade and covers regular school hours, time spent on school buses, and school-sanctioned events. However, the law allows for certain exceptions, such as when internet-enabled devices are needed for disability accommodations or for translation services.

The goal of the legislation is to keep students focused on learning and reduce distractions caused by internet-enabled devices and social media.

We will continue to keep you informed as further developments occur.

Are You Ready For The New Jersey Pay Transparency Act?

Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

Below is an article written by my colleague, Ralph R. Smith, 3rd, Esq., Co-Chair of our firm’s Labor & Employment Group. If you wish to view additional articles and/or be kept up-to-date with labor & employment issues, visit our HR Resource blog by clicking here.

The Pay Transparency Act of New Jersey (“Act”) became law on November 18, 2024, and goes into effect on June 1, 2025. It requires employers to disclose salary ranges in all job postings, including internal and external postings for new jobs, promotions, and transfers. The law further requires that the employer provide a general description of benefits and other compensation programs for which the successful candidate may be eligible. 

The Act applies to employers with 10 or more employees over 20 calendar weeks and who do business, employ persons, and or who take applications for employment within New Jersey, including the State, any county or municipality, or any instrumentality thereof. The law, however, does not indicate whether you count all company employees or only those employed in New Jersey in determining its coverage.

Employers under the Act must disclose the hourly wage, salary, or salary range for job openings and provide a general description of benefits and other compensation programs available for the selected candidate. The law further provides, however, that this requirement does not “prohibit an employer from increasing the wages, benefits, and compensation identified in the job opening posting at the time of making an offer for employment to an applicant.”

In addition, employers must make “reasonable efforts” to announce internal and external promotional opportunities to current employees in the affected department(s) before making a promotion decision. 

The law contains various exceptions to its requirements. The notice requirement for promotions does not apply to promotions based on years of experience or performance, or to promotions made on an emergent basis due to an unforeseen event. The law also expressly excludes temporary help service firms and consulting firms registered with the Division of Consumer Affairs in the Department of Law and Safety from the pay and benefit disclosure requirements for job postings posted for the purpose of identifying qualified applicants for potential future job openings. However, this exception does not apply to job postings for existing job openings.

Finally, the law contains certain new employee protections. Employers are prohibited from discriminating against or discharging employees for exercising their rights under the law, including discussing or disclosing pay-related information, and from asking about salary history during the hiring process. Significantly, the law does not contain a private cause of action. Rather, the Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development may enforce the provisions of this law by seeking civil penalties in an amount no greater than $300 for the first violation and $600 for each subsequent violation.

With the June 1 enforcement date just around the corner, employers should review all internal and external job postings to ensure that they are complying with the new law and likewise confirm that any outside recruiting agencies that are being utilized are also meeting these new transparency requirements. Moreover, if you do business in states other than New Jersey, be aware that New Jersey is not the only state with this type of law: similar laws exist in other states (e.g., Colorado, Maryland, and California to name just a few) so multi-state employers are wise to take steps to comply with the transparency laws in those states as well.   

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